Hegel’s Encyclopaedia Logic constitutes the foundation of the system of philosophy presented in his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Together with his Science of Logic, it contains the most explicit formulation of his enduringly influential dialectical method and of the categorical system underlying his thought. It offers a more compact presentation of his dialectical method than is found elsewhere, and also incorporates changes that he would have made to the second edition of the Science of Logic if he had lived to do so. This volume presents it in a new translation with a helpful introduction and notes. It will be a valuable reference work for scholars and students of Hegel and German idealism, as well as for those who are interested in the post-Hegelian character of contemporary philosophy.
Hegel’s Discovery of the Philosophy of Spirit explores Hegel’s critique of the individualistic ethos of modernity, and the genesis of his alternative vision. Hegel, following Hölderlin and Fichte, sees the conflict between the autonomy trumpeted by philosophers, and the sense of rupture and alienation characteristic of the individual’s experience of life, as the fundamental existential dilemma of the post-Enlightenment era. Viewing the reflective philosophy of subjectivity as the source of this malaise, Hegel suggests that the key to overcoming it lies in rejection of the subjectivist approach and its replacement by a new model of what it means to be an individual. In the early Jena writings, he experiments with various formulations of this insight. Hegel’s Discovery of the Philosophy of Spirit traces the process by which Hegel arrives at this new conception, a process culminating in the second Jena ‘Philosophy of Spirit’ lectures.
On October 13, 1806, Jena fell to Napoleon’s army. Hegel saw the great man himself, history focused to a single point, “this world-soul … on horseback.” Just a few days before, Hegel had sent the first half of his Phenomenology of Spirit to his friend Niethammer in Bamberg, who was to relay the manuscript to the publisher. Despite Hegel’s enthusiasm for Napoleon, there was considerable danger. A few days later, Hegel fled his house and the city, carrying the last pages of the Phenomenology with him. Tradition has it that he finished them amidst the sounds of the battle. . .
This volume includes Hegel’s most important early theological writings, though not all of the materials collected by Herman Nohl in his definitive Hegels theologische Jugendschriften (Tuebingen, 1907). The most significant omissions are a series of fragments to which Nohl give the general title “National Religion and Christianity” and the essay “Life of Jesus.”
In this essay, Hegel attempted to show how Fichte’s Science of Knowledge was an advance from the position of Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, and how Schelling (and incidentally Hegel himself) had made a further advance from the position of Fichte.
Hegel finds the idealism of Fichte too abstractly subjective and formalistic, and he tries to show how Schelling’s philosophy of nature is the remedy for these weaknesses. But the most important philosophical content of the essay is probably to be found in his general introduction to these critical efforts where he deals with a number of problems about philosophical method in a way which is of general interest to philosophers, and not merely interesting to those who accept the Hegelian “dialectic method” which grew out of these first beginnings. Finally, the Difference essay is important in the development of “Nature-Philosophy” as a movement in the history of science.
An English translation of the “Philosphischen Propaedeutik”, a work that holds a unique place in Hegel’s writings. As the basis of Hegel’s own teaching of philosophy, the “Propaedeutic” has the advantage of encapsulating Hegel’s mature system with a simplicity and directness not found in his fuller writings. The lectures have been presented in the order that Hegel delivered them to his pupils. This should make the book both a useful resource for Hegel scholars and a suitable starting-point for students approaching his work for the first time.
What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational. Hegel’s Outlines of the Philosophy of Right is one of the greatest works of moral, social, and political philosophy. It contains significant ideas on justice, moral responsibility, family life, economic activity, and the political structure of the state–all matters of profound interest to us today. Hegel shows that genuine human freedom does not consist in doing whatever we please, but involves living with others in accordance with publicly recognized rights and laws. Hegel demonstrates that institutions such as the family and the state provide the context in which individuals can flourish and enjoy full freedom. He also demonstrates that misunderstanding the true nature of freedom can lead to crime, evil, and poverty. His penetrating analysis of the causes of poverty in modern civil society was to be a great influence on Karl Marx. Hegel’s study remains one of the most subtle and perceptive accounts of freedom that we possess, and this newly revised translation makes it more accessible than ever. This edition incorporates Hegel’s lecture notes within the text and provides a glossary of key terms, up-to-date bibliography, and invaluable notes.
Hegel frequently claimed that the heart of his entire system was a book widely regarded as among the most difficult in the history of philosophy, The Science of Logic. This is the book that presents his metaphysics, an enterprise that he insists can only be properly understood as a “logic,” or a “science of pure thinking.” Since he also wrote that the proper object of any such logic is pure thinking itself, it has always been unclear in just what sense such a science could be a “metaphysics.”
Robert B. Pippin offers here a bold, original interpretation of Hegel’s claim that only now, after Kant’s critical breakthrough in philosophy, can we understand how logic can be a metaphysics. Pippin addresses Hegel’s deep, constant reliance on Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics, the difference between Hegel’s project and modern rationalist metaphysics, and the links between the “logic as metaphysics” claim and modern developments in the philosophy of logic. Pippin goes on to explore many other facets of Hegel’s thought, including the significance for a philosophical logic of the self-conscious character of thought, the dynamism of reason in Kant and Hegel, life as a logical category, and what Hegel might mean by the unity of the idea of the true and the idea of the good in the “Absolute Idea.” The culmination of Pippin’s work on Hegel and German idealism, this is a book that no Hegel scholar or historian of philosophy will want to miss.
Robert B. Pippin is the Evelyn Stefansson Nef Distinguished Service Professor in the John U. Nef Committee on Social Thought, the Department of Philosophy, and the College at the University of Chicago. He is the author of many books on philosophy, literature, art, and film.
In the most influential chapter of his most important philosophical work, the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel makes the central and disarming assertions that “self-consciousness is desire itself” and that it attains its “satisfaction” only in another self-consciousness. Hegel on Self-Consciousness presents a groundbreaking new interpretation of these revolutionary claims, tracing their roots to Kant’s philosophy and demonstrating their continued relevance for contemporary thought.
As Robert Pippin shows, Hegel argues that we must understand Kant’s account of the self-conscious nature of consciousness as a claim in practical philosophy, and that therefore we need radically different views of human sentience, the conditions of our knowledge of the world, and the social nature of subjectivity and normativity. Pippin explains why this chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology should be seen as the basis of much later continental philosophy and the Marxist, neo-Marxist, and critical-theory traditions. He also contrasts his own interpretation of Hegel’s assertions with influential interpretations of the chapter put forward by philosophers John McDowell and Robert Brandom.
Robert Pippin offers a completely new interpretation of Hegel’s idealism, which focuses on Hegel’s appropriation and development of kant’s theoretical project. Hegel is presented neither as a precritical metaphysician nor as a social theorist, but as a critical philosopher whose disagreements with Kant, especially on the issue of intuitions, enrich the idealist arguments against empiricism, realism and naturalism. In the face of the dismissal of absolute idealism as either unintelligible or implausible, Pippin explains and defends an original account of the philosophical basis for Hegel’s claims about the historical and social nature of selfconsciousness, and so of knowledge itself.